NYPD’s Lessons Learned From Tucson-Style Shootings

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The New York Police Department on Jan. 20 gave security officials from the city’s private sector an analysis of active shooter attacks that have taken place over the last 45 years. The analysis noted that the overwhelming majority of such attacks, which are similar to the Jan. 8 shooting in Tucson, Ariz., involve a single attacker that is actively killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area. According to Jessica Tisch, the director of policy and planning at the NYPD’s counterterrorism squad, the fact that 98 percent of active shooter attacks are carried out by just one individual makes them more difficult to detect before they take place. The analysis also found that 46 percent of active shooter attacks ended after law enforcement or bystanders used force against the attacker, while 40 percent ended after the attacker committed suicide. Meanwhile, the NYPD’s Capt. Michael Riggio provided advice to corporate business security officials in attendance at a conference in Manhattan on how to handle active shooter attacks. He said that companies should prepare drills that simulate such attacks and create a room stocked with medical supplies that employees can flee to in the event a shooter is in the building. Riggio also noted that employees should be trained to not approach police officers responding to an active shooter attack, and to evacuate the building with their hands open and above their heads. Finally, Riggio said that if employees cannot avoid a confrontation with the shooter, they should arm themselves with whatever they can find and attack him as aggressively and violently as possible.

By:  Armour National Security Group, LLC – (A New York Security Firm)

ATM Fraud Gets Even More Brazen

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Identity theft and debit-card fraud continues to rise as criminals increasingly target banks’ automated teller machines to “skim” card information and personal-identification numbers. In previous years, most fraud occurred at independent ATMs or at retail points of sale, but in the first six months of 2010, fraud at bank-owned ATMs made up more than 80 percent of the breaches, according to fraud-detection software provider Fair Isaac. Attacks on retailers are also on the rise, with card numbers, cardholder names, and PINs being skimmed from payment terminals. Avivah Litan, fraud analyst at research firm Gartner, estimates that fraud involving debit cards, PINs, and point-of-sale equipment has risen 400 percent in the past five years. One tactic is a “flash attack,” in which gangs use stolen information to create counterfeit debit cards. The gangs then dispatch cronies to hundreds of ATMs in several cities at once, each withdrawing a small dollar amount that adds up to tens of thousands in losses. Some skimming devices are able to fit inside ATM card readers, and small pinhead-sized cameras record hands punching PINs, looking like legitimate security equipment. Most consumers and even banks cannot tell that a machine has been compromised. Perpetrators often place skimmers on outdoor ATMs on Saturday mornings and remove them by Monday morning, passing on the stolen data within hours. Some countries have adopted so-called chip-and-PIN debit cards that have an added layer of protection, but U.S. banks and retailers are hesitant to adopt the technology because of the expense involved.

By :  Armour National Security Group, LLC

Executive Protection: The Private-Sector Model Is Broken

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Chief executives often face unique threats that are not faced by company presidents, requiring a different approach to security. Private-sector leaders may be targeted for a variety of reasons, including their wealth and community presence, and business controversies — for instance, companies that perform product testing on animals, make pharmaceuticals, or drill for oil can attract threats. Many executive protection agencies neglect to consider job-specific security requirements, and whether their employees are adequately qualified for the job. J. Goin, CEO of Armour Security, argues in this column that the model for executive protection in the private sector is broken, and that the security industry has failed to offer up real solutions for executives and their families. He says that executive protection must be approached from the ground up. Examine the legitimate risks to the executive and his or her family: Where do they live? How can vulnerable situations be avoided? Is there a pattern or threatening behavior? “This is a wakeup call for the industry — to both private sector providers and corporate security providers — the service offering is predicated on a model that doesn’t apply to them,” says Goin. “Executives don’t live in the ‘presidential’ market place. As security professionals, we need to find the best intersection between conveniences and effective security.”